The analysis makes use of the IS-LM framework. The discussion is by no means exhaustive or conclusive. However, It appears that in recent years there have been important factors which have altered the slope of the LM curve and others which have shifted it.
A steeper LM curve Increases the effectiveness of monetary policy and vice versa. Two developments in recent years (the growth in the nunberand range of financial intermediaries and the increased volatility of interest rates) have reduced the slope of the LM curve and one (the payment of market-related interest rates to more forms of deposit) has increased the slope.
As regards the position of the LM curve, one could argue that the development of new transactions technologies would have reduced the demand for narrow money, shifting the relevant LM curve to the right. However, broader measures of money may not have been affected, or at least not to the same degree. Also, as innovation Improves the efficiency of the whole financial system, the public might hold fewer financial assets for a given level of activity. This would also tend to shift the LM curve to the right. If financial institutions do not change significantly, then, once the efficacy of the various central bank operations is established, financial institutions can be ignored in discussions of monetary policy. However, if a period of rapid changes in the structure or in the mode of functioning of financial markets occurs, then the efficacy of central bank actions has to be re-examined. (Minsky, 1957, p.171) In addition to the earlier work, much has been written recently by authors such as Donald Hester, Benjamin Friedman, Phillip Cagan, William Silber and economists from the Federal Reserve Board -e.g., Simpson and Porter.
There are several reasons to investigate this topic.
The first reason is the apparently faster pace of financial innovation in the 1980s than previously. Second, monetary policy has been assigned a much more central role for economic stabilisatlon than in earlier decades; and third, we can hardly expect the rate of innovation to abate in the current climate.
Since the mid 1970s, the implications of financial innovation have been of mounting concern to the formulators of monetary policy in the U.S. Three related problems have appeared -greater short-run instability in the demand for money, a less reliable relation between Ml and economic activity, and slower growth in Ml than its historical relation with GDP would have suggested.1 1. Charles Goodhart, of the Bank of England, might have anticipated this since, according to his rule-of-thumb, "any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes" (Goodhart, 1975, p. 5).
2.
To some extent, Australia has avoided the American problems because most emphasis has been put on a relatively broad aggregate (M3) which is less affected by developments that shift balances between different types of bank deposits.
In addition, the differences in institutional regulation mean For an interesting systematisation of these forces for change see Kane (1981) . On the conflict between financial micro efficiency and macro stability see Mayer (1982) . Three aspects of financial innovation can be isolated which tend to alter the slope of either the money-demand or the money_supply function, and hence the slope of the LM curve.
Refore discussing these aspects it should be noted that a steeper LM curve will Indicate more effective monetary policy in the sense of Davis and Lewis (1982, pp. 16-17) .
Much of the early work in this area focussed on the growth in number and range of financial intermediaries and instruments, which was argued to have increased the interest elasticity of the demand for money 3 and thereby reduced the slope ' of the LM schedule. Monetary policy had become less effective, according to this reasoning, since balances were 3. Or, as Ibba Lerner phrased it, the elasticity of supply and of Substitution for money of near-money had increased, but had not become infinite. The slope of the LW function would, on the other hand, tend to increase as innovations eventually bring the payment of market-related interest rates to more and more forms of deposit. In this case, money demand functions become more interest inelastic since yield differentials between assets will appear to remain constant with the whole structure of yields moving in response to market forces (a point made by Davis and Lewis (1982) in their consideration of the effectiveness of monetary policy in a deregulated world where banks could determine the interest rates to be paid on deposits in line with market yields). Again, Ml and M3 demand curves See, for example, Gurley and Shaw (1960), Cagan (1979) and Cagan and Schwartz (1975) on this topic. Marty (1961, pp.59-60 ) outlines a contrary case. Even earlier writersSimons (1936) and Minsky (1957) -had discussed the structural instability produced by innovation.
Two examples are the availability of 24-hour automatic telling machines and cable-TV banking from home, both of which reduce the time costs of transacting. Working in the opposite direction to some extent are the recently introduced transactions taxes. For much more on new payments technologies see Mart! and Zeilinger (1982) . higher-yielding assets outside Ml. As a result, the demand function for Ml shifts to the left6 and the corresponding LM schedule shifts to the right,7 producing higher levels of income (for any given IS curve) and a higher velocity of circulation of money(Ml).
As far as M3 is concerned, the picture becomes a little more complicated by a second effect. Provided that the present division in the payments system between banks and non-banks remains, then it could be argued that, in an accounting sense, funds will only disappear from M3 if they are put into government securities or are transferred overseas.
Otherwise the money which shifts from Ml according to the first shift effect must find its way back into the banking aggregates, in which case an LM curve based on-M3 would hardly shift at all. Consider, for example, funds which are removed from a bank term deposit to be placed with a building society, which in turn puts the funds into Its cheque account with a trading bank. Although Ml increases, M3 is unaffected. What this means is that the growth of a range of close substitutes It also becomes steeper. When only the bare minimum necessary amount of transactions balances remains, the relevant demand curve should be vertical since the demand for transactions balances is presumed not to be interestsensitive. A fourth Influence on the slope of the corresponding LM curve can be discerned here.
Such an exodus could, ofcourse, be stemmed if a market-related rate of interest were paid on current accounts.
9.
for bank deposits need not lead to a fall in M3. However, despite this accounting constancy of the volume of M3, the velocity of M3 might be expected to rise due to the impact of innovations on the effective money supply. People could base spending decisions on the easy availability of the close substitutes for bank deposits (a form of liquidity) and so a higher level of income could be supported from a given base volume of money by encouraging spending in this manner.
The U.S. experience provides more direct evidence of the impact of financial innovations on the supply of money.
New types of transactions media -for example, repurchase agreements (RPs), overnight Eurodollar deposits, sweep accounts and daylight overdrafts -have been designed precisely to provide intra-day funds and consequently to avoid the money-supply reports compiled at the end of the day. In these instances, the supply of Ml available for daily operating purposes is obviously greater than appears in the statistics or is subject to controls.
With these two points, a case begins to form that innovations act to oppose decreases in the supply of money.
This factor might produce an outward shift of the money-supply function -at least an inward shift is resisted.
The third consequence to consider is this: it might also be the case in the longer term that, as successive innovations improve the operating efficiency of the whole financial system, the public will need to hold fewer financial assets to fund a constant level of productive activity. The resources freed from this function will be re-invested for the most rewarding purpose which need not necessarily be with 10.
another financial institution. Therefore, we might expect that, as a behavioural response to a more efficient financial system, the size of the public's total portfolio of financial assets, and hence the demand for money, will decline, shifting the corresponding LM curve to the right.8
The combined effect of the three shift factors pushes the LM curve to the right, thereby working against monetary restraint. Furthermore, it is likely that, for any given increase of the IS curve, innovations enable the LM curve to move accommodatingly to minimise the increase in interest rates and maximise the change in income.
Iv Problems of Definition and Controllability
The upshot of disturbances to the shape and position of the LM function might be to weaken the case for using We observe that when policy presses to decrease the money supply, innovations arise to offset it. (Or on another plane, we could just as well speak of the decrease and increase of th& rate of growth of the money supply.) Many economists 8. In the U.S. context, this effect has also been suggested by Porter, Simpson and Mauskop? (1979) . Over the last two decades in Australia, the velocities of Ml, M2 and M3 have increased, but for a very broad definition of money -total borrowing by all financial institutions -the velocity has declined slightly.
regard this correspondence between monetary regulation or control and financial Innovation to be almost as inevitable as mushrooms after rain.9 Charles Kindleberger put it in the following way:
My contention is that the process is endless: fix any .M 1 and the market will create new forms of money in periods of boom to get around the limit and create the necessity to fix a new variable M. (Kindleberger, 1978, p. 58) In 1936, Henry Simons commented on the feasibility of controlling the quantity of currency and current deposits in a similar tone:
The fixing of the quantity of circulating media might merely serve to increase the perverse variability in the amounts of "near moneys" and in the degree of their general acceptability just as the restrictions on the Issue of bank notes presumably served to hasten the development of deposit (checking-account) banking. (Simons, 1936, p.5) It becomes clear that when institutions or instruments are developed which "monetise" credit in new ways but are excluded from the definition of money, the quantity of money as defined might not grow although its velocity could rise.
Therefore, in spite of the comforting "accounting" view that innovations will not disrupt monetary policy since almost everything has to end up in M3 again, we must be alert to the structural changes beyond our definition. Such changes displace the effective LM curve, alter velocity and disturb monetary control.
In response to such structural change a new variable could be fixed, as Kindleberger suggests. New assets which act as very close substitutes for that which was previously defined as money might now be included In the 9. Kane (1981) has suggested such a pattern and labelled it the regulatory dialectic. Suggested that reserve requirenen5 be imposed on all institutions offering close substitutes for money. So that further circumventjve innovation is discouraged, market rates of interest should also be paid on both required reserves and demand deposits (see Cagan, 1979) . Nevertheless, the costs of data collection, Processing and time lags naturally increase as monetary aggregates encompass more institutions and instruments and ultimately this might begin to impair the effectiveness of Policy. Some trade-off with coverage must be admitted.
Finally, it is pertinent to repeat that -according to the earlier discussion of the second factor altering the slope For a wider discussion of these conditions see Friedman (1982) .
14.
One approach is to push ever harder on the segments still under direct monetary control so that, despite innovation and slippage, the desired end result is achieved. what is an ultimate aim of policy, it has been pointed out (by Albert Wojnilower, for example) that the announcement of a target for GOP comes perilously close to announcing an unemployment rate and this step could often be politically unacceptable.13 The links from policy instruments to GDP are also far less clear than when money is the target variable.
Since each of these proposed alternatives carries significant negative aspects, perhaps the most sensible Option is to follow a programme of Internally consistent multiple targets. Within such a programme, credit, interest rates, money stock and other direct indicators of economic activity might play a role. This amounts to maintaining a broad bank of 13. "Discussion" following Lindsey (1982) , p.269. In this context, it was proposed that a two or three quarters moving average of nominal final sales could become the intermediate target.
